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CONCLUSION
ABSTRACT: The post-cold war period has witnessed a remarkable increase of the fortification 
and militarization of territorial borders as a direct result of  new transnational challenges, including 
terrorism, irregular migration, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling. Today, there are about 65 
border walls around the world; most of them were built in the last three years especially in the Arab 
World and Eastern Europe. Although the fortifications of the Arab States’ borders differ in contexts 
and reasons, they are generally similar in structure and techniques used in their construction. The 
prevention of irregular immigration remains the major goal in the other regions of the world espe-
cially in North America and Eastern Europe; however, security goals, mainly the prevention of the 
infiltration of armed groups, are the main reasons of the fortification of Arab borders. In addition 
to the security goals, the current Arab border fortifications intend to prevent regular migration, 
goods smuggling, and drug trafficking. Furthermore, this policy strives, in some cases, to unilate-
rally impose the de facto border. The key question the paper addresses is: to what extent does this 
fortification of Arab borders reflect the nature of the existing regional subsystems? The paper takes 
into account that Arab regional subsystems are characterized by mutual mistrust and suspicion, 
which prevent Arab states to adopt common security border policies. In addition, the current border 
policies are inseparable from the way in which the postcolonial Arab states’ borders were drawn.
KEYWORDS: Border, fence, wall, trench, Arab States, regional subsystems, border fortification, 
immigration and armed groups.
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RESUMEN: El periodo posguerra fría ha sido testigo de un aumento notable de la fortificación y 
militarización de las fronteras territoriales como resultado directo de los nuevos desafíos transna-
cionales, incluidos el terrorismo, la migración irregular, el tráfico de drogas y el contrabando de 
armas. Hoy en día, existe alrededor de 65 muros fronterizos en todo el mundo; la mayoría de ellos 
fueron construidos en los últimos tres años, especialmente en el mundo árabe y Europa del Este. 
Aunque las fortificaciones de las fronteras de los Estados árabes difieren en contextos y razones, 
en general son similares en estructura y técnicas utilizadas en su construcción. La prevención de 
la inmigración irregular sigue siendo el objetivo principal en las otras regiones del mundo, es-
pecialmente en América del Norte y Europa del Este; sin embargo, los objetivos de seguridad, 
principalmente la prevención de la infiltración de grupos armados, son las principales razones del 
fortalecimiento de las fronteras árabes. Además de los objetivos de seguridad, las fortificaciones 
actuales de las fronteras árabes pretenden evitar la migración regular, el contrabando de bienes y el 
tráfico de drogas. Además, esta política se esfuerza, en algunos casos, para imponer unilateralmente 
la frontera de facto. La principal cuestión que trata este artículo es: ¿en qué medida la fortificación 
de las fronteras árabes refleja la naturaleza de los subsistemas regionales existentes? El articulo 
toma en consideración que los subsistemas regionales árabes se caracterizan por la desconfianza 
y la desconfianza mutua, lo que impide que los Estados árabes adopten políticas comunes para la 
seguridad de las fronteras. Además, las políticas fronterizas actuales son inseparables de la forma 
en que se dibujaron las fronteras de los Estados árabes después de la etapa colonial.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Frontera, valla, muro, trinchera, Estados árabes, subsistemas regionales, 
fortificación fronteriza, inmigración y grupos armados.
RÉSUME : La période de l’après-guerre froide a connu une augmentation remarquable de la for-
tification et de la militarisation des frontières territoriales, conséquence directe des nouveaux défis 
transnationaux, notamment le terrorisme, la migration irrégulière, le trafic de drogue et la contre-
bande d’armes. Aujourd’hui, il existe environ 65 murs frontaliers dans le monde entier. La plupart 
d’entre eux ont été construits au cours des trois dernières années, en particulier dans le Monde 
Arabe et en Europe Orientale. Bien que les fortifications des frontières des États arabes soient 
différents ; dans leurs contextes et leurs raisons, leur structure et leurs techniques, elles demeurent 
néanmoins   similaires. Si la prévention de l’immigration irrégulière reste l’objectif majeur dans les 
autres régions du monde, notamment en Amérique du Nord et en Europe de l’Est, dans le monde 
arabe les principales raisons du renforcement des frontières sont d’ordre sécuritaire, principalement 
la prévention de l’infiltration des groupes armés. Outre ces objectifs de sécurité, les fortifications 
actuelles de la frontière arabe ont pour objectif d’empêcher les migrations régulières, la contreban-
de de marchandises et le trafic de drogue. En outre, cette politique s’efforce, dans certains cas, d’im-
poser de facto la frontière. La question principale qu’aborde cet article est la suivante : dans quelle 
mesure la fortification des frontières arabes reflète-t-elle la nature des sous-systèmes régionaux 
existants ? Cette  analyse prend en considération le fait que les sous-systèmes régionaux arabes se 
caractérisent par la méfiance réciproque qui empêche les États d’adopter des politiques communes 
en matière de sécurité frontalière.
MOTS CLÉS : Frontière, barrière, mur, tranchée, États arabes, sous-systèmes régionaux, fortifica-
tion des frontières, immigration et groupes armés.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Arab world, the construction of  border barriers is relatively a new 
phenomenon compared to other cases across the world. Except for walls 
built on the perimeters of  the old cities to protect them from attacks of  in-
vaders and looters, the pre-colonial Arab world was almost entirely open and 
with no internal borders because it was governed, most of  the time, by large 
empires. During the colonial period, some colonial authorities erected fences 
along some borders as the Italians did when they constructed a 186-mile 
barbed wire fence along the Libya-Egypt border in the region of  Cyrenaica to 
prevent guerrillas from getting reinforcements and supplies from Egypt and 
slipping back and forth across the border.2 In Palestine, the British Mandate 
constructed fences along the Palestine border with both Lebanon and Syria 
to prevent militants from joining the 1936–1939 Palestinian revolt. Those 
fences were abandoned and dismantled during World War II.3
The first modern separation barriers in the Arab World were built by 
Israel in the occupied territories. In the aftermath of  the 1967 war, Israel 
constructed a huge sand wall (was knowns as the Bar-Lev Line) stretched for 
170 kilometers in the Sinai Peninsula to consolidate the military gains resul-
ting from the war.4  In the 1980s, Morocco constructed a 2,200 km military 
sand wall in Western Sahara as a defensive line against the separatists.5 The 
Western Sahara wall was considered the longest military barrier at the time. 
In the early 1990s, Kuwait erected barbed wire fences along its border with 
Iraq in the aftermath of  the Iraqi invasion of  Kuwait. Since then, the Arab 
region has witnessed a growing number of  border barriers over the past two 
decades due to the new security challenges facing the region, making the 
Arab world the most walled region in the world. These walls and fences are 
not just physical fortifications, but are also sophisticated, high-tech, and cost-
ly surveillance systems.
2 Vanderwalle, D, A History of  Modern Libya, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 
p. 30.
3 Saddiki, S, World of  Walls: Structure, Roles and Effectiveness of  Separation Barriers, Cambridge: 
Open Book Publishers, 2017, p.27.
4 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
5 Saddiki, S, “The Sahara Wall: Status and Prospects”, Journal of  Borderlands Studies 27, No 2: 
2012, pp. 199-212.
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The regional subsystem is an appropriate framework to study the phe-
nomenon of  the fortification of  national borders in the Arab world “since 
most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones,”6 
and also because the nature and structure of  the regional subsystem largely 
affect border management policies. The Arab world, as a large region, has 
been divided by some authors into three regional subsystems: the Gulf, the 
Levant and the Maghreb.7 Some authors regard the Middle-East as two small 
separate subsystems: the Gulf  and the Levant. For historical and social re-
asons, this paper distinguishes between two main quasi-autonomous Arab 
subsystems: The Middle-East and the Maghreb. Arab regional subsystems are 
not strictly separate from each other and there are no buffer or insulator sta-
tes between them. Rather, they are intertwined and interdependent, but each 
one is characterized by a specific structure, entities and interactions. Egypt 
can be seen as a joint country between the two regional subsystems, but it 
is more connected to the Middle East region. Arab regional subsystems are 
formed by states that are relatively equal in weight8. There are no big powers 
that can impose themselves as uncontested regional hegemon, or at least as 
pivotal states, in all Arab subsystems. Therefore, ambitious regional actors are 
in constant competition for regional influence and leadership. Regardless of  
the major influence of  non-state actors on the current border management in 
the Arab world, states remain the main actor in the Arab regional subsystems.
Security threats, disputed borders and competition for influence are the 
main determinants that generate Arab regional subsystems. Bury Buzan and 
Ole Wæver argue that regional security complex (RSC) mainly depends on 
security interdependence among a group of  states or other actors within a 
region.9 The structure and determinants of  Arab subsystems are ever-chan-
ging and affected by a large set of  determinants that shape the preferences 
of  decision-makers including security threats, disputed borders and compe-
tition for influence. Although Israel was seen in the past as the main threat 
to the Arab ‘security’, especially in the Middle-East, it is no longer the source 
6 Buzan, B, and wæVer, O., Regions and Powers: The Structure of  International Security. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.4
7 Ibid., p. 188.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p.229.
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of  security and military threats. Instead, it is seen by some Arab leaders as a 
potential partner against new security challenges.
II. THE FORTIFICATION OF ARAB BORDERS: SECURITY AND POLITICAL GOALS
Despite the diversity of  goals of  contemporary border security barriers, 
they can be summarized in four major objectives: to prevent the infiltration 
of  members of  armed groups and separatist movements; to stop irregular 
migration; to prevent smuggling of  all kinds of  contraband – foods, drugs, 
weapons…— or only to impose de facto borders. In the Arab world, most 
of  the new border fortifications have been created for purely security pur-
poses that are imposed by new cross-border security challenges. Irregular 
migration is the main cause of  most physical border walls around the world, 
particularly in Europe and North America; however, most of  the new Arab 
border barriers (fences, trenches, sand curtains…etc) have been built to stop 
infiltration of  armed groups and arms smuggling. Although the fortifications 
that were built by some Arab countries on their borders in recent years differ 
in context and reasons, they are generally similar in shape, structure and tech-
niques used in their construction.
1. BORDER WALLS IN THE MAGHREB REGION
The Moroccan-Algerian border has been closed since 1994, following an 
armed attack on a hotel in Marrakech, of  which the Algerian security services 
were accused by Morocco. The current fortification of  the Moroccan-Alge-
rian border is carried out simultaneously on both sides and without coordi-
nation between the two neighboring countries. The competition for regional 
influence between Morocco and Algeria and their many political differences, 
especially on the question of  Western Sahara, prevented the two countries 
from coordinating their efforts and agreeing on a unified strategy to fortify 
and monitor their borders. In 2014, Morocco began to build a fence along 
150 km of  its north-eastern border with Algeria. The fence is equipped with 
electronic sensors to prevent the infiltration of  members of  armed groups, 
migrants, and other irregular cross-border movements.10 On the other side of  
the border, since 2013, Algeria began to establish its own border barrier with 
10 Saddiki, S., “Fortifying the Morocco-Algeria Border: Security Concerns and Regional 
Competition,” paper presented at the International Conference “Borders, Walls and Vio-
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Morocco. The Algerian barrier is a trench reinforced by an electronic system 
to strengthen monitoring on its land border with Morocco. In 2014, Algeria 
adopted a new security strategy that turned its borders with five neighboring 
countries, including Morocco, to military zones.
Although Morocco and Algeria have simultaneously initiated the fortifi-
cation of  their common land borders, the priorities of  their objectives vary 
according to the specific challenges of  each country. Combating the security 
threat of  cross-border armed groups is the top priority of  Algeria›s policy 
to control its borders, especially with Mali, Libya and Tunisia, whereas it is 
only a secondary objective with regard to its border with Morocco, where the 
fight against smuggling, especially gasoline, is the main objective.11 Almost 
everything was being smuggled across the Morocco-Algeria border before 
the large fortification process that the two countries had pursued over the 
past three years. The smuggling was mainly carried out from Algeria to Mo-
rocco due to a large disparity in prices between the two countries, especially 
gasoline, which was benefiting from significant government subsidies in Al-
geria.12
For Morocco, preventing irregular migration and combating the infiltra-
tion of  armed groups are the primary objectives of  the fence that was built 
by the Moroccan authorities on some parts of  its north-eastern border with 
Algeria. Although the land border between the two countries has been closed 
since 1994, it remains one of  the most favored areas of  sub-Saharan African 
migrants to enter Morocco via Algeria. Stopping drug trafficking on the two 
sides of  the border is one the common objectives of  both the Moroccan fen-
ce and the Algerian trench. While Algeria is the main source of  hallucinoge-
nic tablets seized in Morocco, the latter remains the main source of  cannabis 
entering Algeria.13
lence: Costs and Alternatives to Border Fencing” organized by the Raoul Dandurand Chair 
at the University of  Quebec at Montreal, Canada, June 2-3, 2016.
11 Ibid.
12 Hanlon, Q. and HerBert, M. “Border Security Challenges in the Grand Maghreb.”, Peace-
works, No 109, 2015, p.7.
13 united StateS department of State, Bureau for international narcoticS and law 
enforcement affairS, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical 
Control, March 1, 2010, p.108.
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In addition to the security objectives, political reasons are the indirect 
goal of  fortifying the common borders between the two countries, especially 
from the Algerian side. Morocco has repeatedly called for the reopening of  
the land border between the two countries for economic reasons. However, 
Algeria still refuses to do so because it is not in its political and economic 
interest to respond positively to this request, at least in the near term.
As Algeria faces security challenges on its border with Tunisia and Libya, 
the Algerian government has begun building a wire barbed fence along its 
border with these two neighboring countries. The fence, which extends about 
350 kilometers and is 3 meters high, aimed at the same security objectives 
as most other Arab countries› fortifications. The security turmoil in Libya is 
the most important factor that led Algeria to tighten control on its borders 
with Libya and Tunisia. Libya remains a fertile area for the activities of  many 
cross-border armed groups which have carried out operations in neighbo-
ring countries. With regard to the immediate objectives, the new Algerian 
security strategy was meant to achieve two main goals: to stop the infiltration 
of  armed groups and prevent the smuggling of  weapons into the Algerian 
territory. It is worth mentioning that, in the past two decades, Algeria has 
witnessed a series of  bombings of  government and corporate buildings and 
kidnappings of  foreigners carried out by members of  armed groups traveling 
through its long border, especially in the south of  the country.
On the Tunisian-Libyan border, the Tunisian government began building 
security fortifications on its border with Libya in April 2015 due to the secu-
rity unrest in Libya. It is a double border barrier consisting of  water trenches 
and a sand wall that were built in parallel to one another.14 This fortification 
runs along 220 kilometers on the Tunisian-Libyan border of  about 500 km 
and was built five kilometers from the border. The fortification was built 
with international financial and technical support and it cost about $75 mi-
llion. This expense is relatively  modest compared to budgets of  some other 
border fences such as the Saudi fences on its border with Yemen and Iraq. 
Tunisia adopted this security strategy because of  the growing security unrest 
in Libya. The decision to fortify the border is made immediately after the 
attack on the Bardo National Museum in Tunis in March 2015 carried out by 
terrorists who infiltrated into Tunisia through its border with Libya. So, the 
14 amara, T., “Tunisia finishes Libya border fence intended to keep out militants.” Reuters, 
February 6, 2016. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-security-idUSKCN0VF0VR>
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primary objective of  the fortification of  the Tunisia-Libya border is to stop 
the infiltration of  members of  armed groups from Libya into Tunisia.
In northern Morocco, the Spanish authorities have completely fenced off  
Ceuta and Melilla to prevent Sub-Saharan immigrants from entering the two 
enclaves.Ceuta and Melilla, and other Moroccan Mediterranean islands, are 
still occupied by Spain since the end of  the Reconquista. The fencing of  peri-
meters of  the two enclaves began in 1993 with the support of  the European 
Union (EU). Since then, Spanish authorities have reinforced and renovated 
these fortifications using advanced technology, including infrared cameras, 
video and audio sensors, monitoring towers and radar systems. The fences of  
Ceuta and Melilla are part of  the EU›s policy of  fortifying its external bor-
ders against irregular migration. Given the geographical location of  these two 
enclaves as a de facto border of  the EU in North Africa, they have become a 
destination for thousands of  sub-Saharan African migrants over the last two 
decades. Irregular migrants prefer this destination because they can reach the 
«European Territory» once they enter one of  the two cities, and this route is 
less dangerous than sailing on “death-boats” across the Mediterranean Sea or 
the Atlantic Ocean towards an unknown fate. In addition to the stated ob-
jective, the erection of  fences of  the Ceuta and Melilla has other long-term 
goals that are fundamentally linked to the legal and political status of  the two 
disputed cities. It is therefore possible to say that the construction of  these 
fences is one of  the measures through which Spain aims to consolidate the 
status quo of  the occupation as an essential element of  a comprehensive Spa-
nish strategy that takes various forms and steps, including the construction 
of  wire fences, de facto delimitation of  the border with Morocco, granting 
autonomy to the two occupied enclaves, frequent visits of  the King of  Spain 
and members of  Spanish government to the two cities and the enactment of  
strict immigration laws.
In the south, Morocco built a sand wall in Western Sahara in the mid-
1980s to stop attacks of  the separatist movement.15 This wall does not consti-
tute Morocco‘s international border with Mauritania and Algeria. It is merely 
a defensive sand wall that was built on Moroccan territory leaving a buffer 
zone in the south and east of  the wall to avoid chasing POLISARIO guerillas 
15 Saddiki, S., “The Sahara Wall: Status and Prospects”...cit., p.204.
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into Algerian territory or violating Mauritanian sovereignty. The wall has had 
a major impact on the conflict and favored the Moroccan military strategy.
Although the sand wall was initially built for defensive purposes, since the 
early 1990s, its functions have significantly changed after the establishment 
of  the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MI-
NURSO). At the end of  1997 and the beginning of  1998, MINURSO signed 
a military agreement with Morocco and Polisario, whereby the wall became 
a milestone for determining the obligations of  the two parties and clarif-
ying the operational framework of  MINURSO ceasefire monitoring efforts.16 
Now, the sand wall is playing new roles pertaining to the growing security 
challenges in the Sahel and Sahara region, particularly irregular migration, 
drug trafficking and the activities of  armed groups.
2. BORDER WALLS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
One of  the direct security implications of  the Second Gulf  War in 1991 
is that the states of  the region started to fortify their borders by constructing 
fences equipped with advanced surveillance technologies. Iraq and Yemen 
are the most targeted countries by these border fences. However, it is worth 
distinguishing between barriers of  Arab countries that are officially justified 
by security and political concerns and those established by Israel in order to 
perpetuate the occupation and annex more Palestinian land.
Kuwait was the first country to adopt this strategy in the Middle East. It 
erected a wire fence of  190 km along its border with Iraq after its liberation 
from the Iraqi invasion in 1991. The fence was built on the basis of  Security 
Council resolution 687 of  3 April 1991 establishing a demilitarized zone be-
tween Iraq and Kuwait, which extended 10 km inside Iraq and five km inside 
Kuwait. In 2004, Kuwait decided to build a new wire fence along 217 Km 
of  its border with Iraq from Umm Qasr to the confluence of  the borders of  
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In 2006, the Kuwaiti and Iraqi governments 
agreed to complete the wall. The agreement also included compensation for 
Iraqi farmers affected by this fence. The Kuwaiti fence had a principal politi-
cal goal aimed at defining the international border between the two countries 
and preventing the re-invasion of  Kuwait by Iraq. The secondary security 
16 MINURSO, Military Agreement No. 1 signed by MINURSO with the Royal Moroccan 
Army (RMA) and the Frente POLISARIO respectively, <http://web.archive.org/
web/20090210055157/http://www.minurso.unlb.org/monitoring.html>.
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goal intended to stop the infiltration of  individuals trying to enter Kuwaiti 
territory. But with the changing security environment in the region during 
the years following the fall of  Saddam Hussein›s regime, the secondary goal 
has become a primary objective, especially after Iraq has become a breeding 
ground for armed groups. This explains why the Kuwaiti authorities is cons-
tantly restoring, expanding and enhancing the fence by more with advanced 
monitoring technologies.
Saudi Arabia is one of  the Arab countries most vulnerable to cross-bor-
der threats because of  the length and porosity of  its borders, as well as its 
proximity to unstable areas. Immediately after the Second Gulf  War, Saudi 
Arabia began to think of  building a border fence along its border with Iraq. 
In 2008, the Saudi Ministry of  the Interior launched an international tender 
for the construction of  a huge fence whose first phase was estimated to cost 
$907 million.17 In 2009, Saudi Arabia actually started building a fence along 
900 km on its border with Iraq. This security barrier consists of  a three-tiered 
barbed wire, remote sensors, night vision cameras and military bases. The 
construction of  the fence has been accelerated in recent years following the 
growing activities of  the organization of  the Islamic State of  Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) near Saudi territory. On its southern border, Saudi Arabia started in 
2003 erecting a border fence with Yemen along 1,800 km and three meters 
high, but the construction was halted due to Yemen›s objections. The erec-
tion of  the fence resumed in 2011 after the outbreak of  the uprising in Ye-
men.18 The Saudi-Yemeni border fence is an example of  how security reasons 
pushed the Saudi authorities to build one of  the longest border fences in the 
world. The length and permeability of  the Saudi-Yemeni border further exa-
cerbate the security challenges. Irregular migration, drug trafficking, weapons 
smuggling and infiltration of  militants are the most important reasons that 
led Saudi Arabia to allocate a huge budget to build this fence and reinforce it 
with sophisticated monitoring systems.
Although the UAE does not face direct security risks on its borders by 
armed groups, it has adopted a sophisticated border security policy. It has 
17 GloBal Security, “Saudi Border Security Program,” Global Security, May 20, 2017. <https://
www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/saudi/miksa.htm>.
18 feVrier, R., “La «grande muraille» de l’Arabie Saoudite contre l’Etat islamique,” Temps 
Reel, January 18, 2015. <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20150118.OBS0206/la-
grande-muraille-de-l-arabie-saoudite-contre-l-etat-islamique.html>.
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fenced its entire border with Oman and equipped it with sophisticated survei-
llance technologies. Since 2005, the UAE has also initiated fencing its border 
with Saudi Arabia as part of  a comprehensive UAE policy to secure its bor-
ders. Irregular migrants and smuggling, especially cars, are the most impor-
tant reasons for fortifying the UAE border with Oman, whereas the political 
goal is the main proponent of  the fortification of  its borders with Saudi Ara-
bia. The Emirati fence on the Saudi border primarily aimed at defining the 
de facto border, which has long been the subject of  controversy because of  
the presence of  significant oil reserves in some areas of  the common border 
regions.
For its part, Oman decided to build a security fence on its border with 
Yemen after the intensification of  Yemen›s internal crisis due to fear of  its se-
curity repercussions and to stop arms smuggling and infiltration of  members 
of  armed groups. Since then, the Yemeni government has contracted with 
companies specialized in fortifying national borders, but there are currently 
no indications of  the implementation of  this project.
On the Egyptian-Palestinian border, Egypt began in 2009 digging an un-
derground wall on its border with the Gaza Strip to block tunnels used by 
Palestinians to break the embargo imposed on Gaza since 2007. The wall 
consists of  iron sheets and sensors, which are connected to pipes that can 
be used to saturate the ground around the wall with pumped-in seawater in 
order to make the tunnels collapsible.19
Israeli separation barriers, whether inside Palestine or on its borders with 
the rest of  the Arab states, are one of  the pillars of  the Israeli security doc-
trine. Since its inception in 1948, Israel has erected various separation walls 
and barriers, which, though are different in structure and effectiveness, are 
similar in purpose. Israel›s fences and walls can be distinguished, based on 
their geographical locations, into three types: barriers separating Israelis and 
Palestinians, barriers separating Palestinians themselves, and de facto border 
barriers separating Israel from Arab states. With regard to the objectives of  
the Israeli barriers, although each of  them was established in a special con-
text, their goals are highly intertwined. This reality is largely explained by the 
assumption that Israeli walls and fences derive their political rationale from 
the same policy. Security concerns and the annexation of  more Palestinian 
19 urSula, L., “Egypt’s Wall,” Middle East Research and Information Project, February 2010. 
<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020110>.
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land are the cornerstones of  this Israeli policy. The intensified militarization 
of  Israeli dividing lines and the establishment of  buffer zones with Arab 
countries, whether in Gaza, the West Bank, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria or Jordan, 
aimed at perpetuating the occupation or at least monitoring the «other side“. 
Regardless of  UN resolutions recognizing the existence of  the Jewish state 
within the 1949 armistice lines, the way and context in which it was founded 
made Israel in a hostile environment and abnormal situation. Although most 
Arab states recognize Israel at least implicitly, their people have never accep-
ted normalization with the Jewish state. The Israeli separation walls reflect, to 
some extent, the constant fear which Israel feels.
On the Syrian border with Turkey, after the escalation of  the civil war in 
Syria and the spread of  security repercussions to neighboring countries, the 
Turkish government decided to establish a security fortification on its border 
with Syria, which extends over 900 km to stop the entry of  militants from 
Syria into Turkish territory. This decision was made immediately after the 
suicide bombing in the town of  Suruç in the South East of  Turkey, which 
killed 32 people in July 2015.20
III. THE FORTIFICATION OF ARAB BORDERS  
AND EXISTING REGIONAL SUBSYSTEMS
Regional changes have prompted Arab states to radically change their 
border policies in recent years. New border policies take different aspects, in-
cluding the erection of  walls and fences, digging trenches and using advanced 
security control mechanisms. Accordingly, many questions are raised about 
the relation between this phenomenon and the situation of  Arab “nation-sta-
tes”. Is the fortification of  territorial borders an aspect of  the erosion of  
Arab states or a consolidation of  their sovereignty and capability to control 
their territories?
Some liberal theories affirm that the nation-state is undergoing further 
erosion and decay because of  cross-border security challenges, modern te-
chnological developments in transport and communication, and the growing 
influence of  non-state actors. This view sees the current fortification of  na-
20 calderwood, I., “Shutting the door after the horse has bolted!”, Daily Mail, October 
16, 2015. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3274756/Shutting-door-horse-bolted-
Turkey-begins-build-wall-border-Syria-bid-halt-jihadis-crossing-illegally-join-ISIS.html>.
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tional borders as a desperate attempt by the nation-state to confront different 
aspects of  globalization and cross-border interactions. However, assuming 
that the nation-state is losing its control over the national border is misleading 
because it erroneously presumes that the nation-state has effectively monito-
red its border in the past, but in fact, there was no «golden age» of  absolute 
state control over national territory.21 The fact that the state was constantly 
changing undermines the argument of  a borderless world and the demise of  
the nation-state and gives more relevance to theories arguing that the forti-
fication of  national borders by building walls or digging trenches reaffirms 
the centrality of  the nation-state as the dominant actor in both national and 
international affairs.
In fact, the current fortification of  the frontier is a manifestation of  ins-
tability resulting from the unipolar system and the emergence of  independent 
sub-groups in failed states that pose a real threat to the internal security.22 In 
order to maximize national security in this anarchical environment, states 
take preventive measures to fortify their borders.23 In other words, border 
fortification reflects the nation-state’s determination to protect sovereignty 
against external threats to its national security, as well as its constant tendency 
to stabilize existing borders.
Given recent theoretical and practical developments in international po-
litics, it is more likely that territorial borders in the Arab region or elsewhere, 
despite all the challenges they face, do not tend to disappear or eclipse, but 
they are also not immune to change. Instead, they are being reshaped by crea-
ting new methods of  monitoring and controlling cross-border movements, 
including the militarization of  some areas to exclude irregular transnational 
activities. Even in Western countries, although the traditional military and 
economic functions of  the border are declining, the fortification of  borders 
21 tHomSon, J. and kraSner, S., “Global Transactions and the Consolidation of  Sovereignty,” 
In Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, edited by 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, 1989, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, p. 
189.
22 Beaulieu-BroSSard, P., and daVid, C.P., “Le blindage des frontières selon les théories 
des Relations Internationales : contribution et dialogue,” L’Espace Politique, July 18, 2013. 
<http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/2637>.
23 waltz, K., “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1: 2000, p. 
30.
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to control irregular aspects of  globalization has expanded considerably. Even 
if  globalization has diluted military and economic borders, it has significantly 
enhanced the border policing function.24 In the Arab world, despite all the 
dangers that threaten Arab states, especially after the “Arab Spring” uprisings, 
they remain until now the main political and economic actors  and the sym-
bol of  national identity. In addition to security objectives, the fortification 
of  borders of  Arab countries borders can also be regarded as a means to 
legitimize their existence.
In terms of  existing regional subsystems, external determinants are the 
most important reasons for the current fortification of  Arab borders. Moreo-
ver, these factors are closely related to the nature of  existing regional subsys-
tems, especially the Maghreb and the Middle East. Most of  these fortifica-
tions reflect the mutual suspicion and fear among neighboring Arab countries 
and their inability to agree on common ways to secure their borders. This 
anarchical and confused situation has prompted many countries in the region 
to unilaterally secure their borders with more physical and virtual fortifica-
tions. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, there are two important 
historical factors that have created the ground for this turbulent and anarchi-
calregional situation: First, the arbitrary demarcation of  the territorial bor-
ders by the colonial powers and, secondly, the way in which the post-colonial 
Arab states were constructed.
In the Maghreb, although Morocco and Algeria signed a land demarcation 
agreement on July 15, 1972, which ratified by Algeria on 17 May 19, 1973, 
Morocco waited almost a decade to ratify it on May 28, 1992. Morocco’s delay 
in ratifying this agreement had raised Algeria’s fear of  Morocco’s ambitions 
for regional hegemony. The fortification of  the Moroccan-Algerian land bor-
der can be seen as an aspect of  the current Maghreb subsystem, which is 
marked by a regional anarchy because of  mutual fear and suspicion between 
the two rival states and the absence of  a strong regional organization that 
can foster trust between them. At the same time, there is no real common 
enemy that can push the two countries to reconcile their border policies. The 
sand wall in Western Sahara falls within this context and reflects the complex 
(intra)-regional rivalry between Maghreb countries, especially Morocco and 
Algeria. In contrast to most analysts, who see the Western Sahara issue as 
24 andreaS, P., “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century.” 
International Security 28, no. 2: 2003, p. 84.
Said SaddiKi
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 6, janvier-décembre 2018, pp. 145-160
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.25267/Paix_secur_int.2018.i6.08
159
the main cause of  the permanent tension between Morocco and Algeria, I 
argue that this dispute is merely an aspect of  the existing Maghreb regional 
subsystem, which is reflected in the competition between the two countries.
In the Gulf  region, there are no serious internal threats. Major security 
threats come from cross-border armed groups and neighboring countries. 
Gulf  states successfully contained the potential security and social internal 
threat thanks to huge oil revenues. At the regional level, despite the existence 
of  an important regional organization that includes all the countries of  the 
region, namely the Gulf  Cooperation Council (GCC), has not yet been able 
to adopt common policies for joint management of  internal and external 
borders. This highly ambiguous regional situation is explained by many fac-
tors including competing foreign policies of  the member states of  the GCC, 
the absence of  trust among them, and some latent border disputes that are 
still unresolved. A similar situation exists to the relations between the Gulf  
states and their neighbors in the region, mainly Yemen and Iraq. This exp-
lains why these two countries are the most targeted Arab countries by border 
fortifications from the other side of  their borders. Today, the Gulf  region is 
the most fenced place in the World. It is, in fact, a complicated border fencing 
that applies to bothexternal and intra-regional borders in the Gulf.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new Arab border barriers are primarily constructed for security re-
asons, mainly to prevent the infiltration of  armed groups, but, in the same 
time, they  reflectsthe nature of  the existing Arab regional subsystems. In 
other words, terrorism and other trans-border security threats are the direct 
reasons of  this phenomenon; however, the architecture of  the current regio-
nal subsystems and the nature of  the balance of  power between neighboring 
Arab countries are the major determinants of  their policies toward further 
fortification of  their common land borders.
Although the new Arab border barriersare build in different security and 
political contexts, they are generally similar in structure and techniques used 
in their construction. However, the Arab states differ in the capabilities to 
invest high-technologies in fortifying their borders. Gulf  States allocate huge 
budgets to engaged with international companies in fencing and equipping 
their borders with high-tech control systems, whereas the Maghreb states 
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use relatively low technology systems and traditional means in fencing and 
trenching their borders.
Despite all the external challenges faced by the nation-state in the Arab 
region, it remains the most powerful symbol of  the people›s identity. This na-
tional identity is currently the main determinant of  Arab states’ foreign policy 
more than pan-Arab and religious principles of  solidarity. Although new di-
fferent fortifications of  Arab borders reflect part of  the external threats, they 
also show the ability of  Arab states to adapt to these challenges and imitated 
policies of  other states in fortifying territorial borders. However, the preser-
vation of  territorial unity and the existing borders of  Arab states –especially 
those with different ethnics, sects, and languages– depends not only on figh-
ting external challenges posed by the chaotic regional system but also on the 
ability of  Arab states to achieve equitable distribution of  wealth and power.
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